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By monitoring and 
investigating errors 
in the criminal justice 
system, innocence 
commissions could help 
remedy systemic defects 
that bring about 
wrongful convictions. 
By Barry C. Scheck 
and Peter J. Neufeld 
I n the United States there are strict and immediate investiga-tive measures taken when an air-
plane falls from the sky, a plane's fuel 
tank explodes on a runway, or a train 
derails. Serious inquiries are swiftly 
made by the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB), an agency with 
subpoena power, great expertise, and 
real independence to answer the im-
portant and obvious questions: What 
went wrong? Was it system error or an 
individual's mistake? Was there any 
official misconduct? And, most im-
portant of all , what can be done to 
correct the problem and prevent it 
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from happening again? Indeed, since 
the primary purpose of the NTSB is 
to protect the public safety, it will 
sometimes issue safety recommenda-
98 Judicature Volume 86, Number 2 September-October 2002 
tions before its investigation of a 
crash is complete, recommendations 
identifying problems that may not 
even turn out to be the ultimate 
cause of the crash. 
The American criminal justice sys-
tem, in sharp contrast, has no institu-
tional mechanism to evaluate its 
equivalent of a catastrophic plane 
crash, the conviction of an innocent 
person. In fact, an emphasis on final-
ity and procedural due process in our 
post-conviction procedures has for 
too long obscured both the fre-
quency and implications of wrongful 
convictions. This point is vividly illus-
trated by the 110 post-conviction 
DNA exonerations that have oc-
curred in the United States in the 10 
years preceding September 1, 2002. 1 
Although these cases all involve con-
victions on serious felony charges 
that were affirmed on direct appeal, 
and often upheld after post-convic-
tion proceedings in both state and 
federal courts, there has never been a 
I . A running list and description of post-con-
viction DNA exonerations compiled by the Inno-
ce n ce Proj ec t is ava il a ble at h!!.Jl;.LL 
innocenceprojec t. or~. 
2. E.g. see Bailey, DNA Clears Man jailed 22 Years, 
But DoM Still Shut, The Commercial Appeal , May 
3, 2002, at Al, where District Attorney General Bill 
Gibbons, commenting on the exoneration of 
Clark McMillan, a man wrongly convicted of rape 
and robbery and who seived 22 years in jail, longer 
than any other exoneree, before DNA evidence 
proved he was innocent, said "I think it shows our 
system works." See also Marshall, Do exonerations 
prove that "the system works?"in this issue (page 83) . 
3. It has been suggested by colleagues that the 
term "innocence commission" is both "too nar-
row" because the reforms expected to emerge 
from such bodies would not just protect the inno-
cent but also lead to the apprehension of the 
guilty, and politically undesirable as the phrase 
"innocence commission" would be seen as a term 
favorable to the criminal defense movement. See 
Findley, Learning.from Our Mistakes: A Criminal jus-
tice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 
CAL. W. L. REv. 333,353 (Spring 2002). This point 
may be correct. We have always wanted "inno-
cence commissions" to be understood as organiza-
tions dedicated to a public safety imperative, gen-
erating findings that would be perceived as just, 
good law enforcement. The political process will 
ultimate ly determine whether the term "inno-
cence" is loaded and identified as a criminal de-
fense code word. We like the term because it goes 
to the heart of what the average citizen expects of 
the criminal justice system "to protect the inno-
cent, apprehend the guilty, and correct mistakes 
when the innocent are wrongly convicted. " 
4. The Innocence Project's list of post-convic-
tion DNA exonerations is composed entirely of 
such "officially acknowledged" wrongful convic-
tions. A DNA exoneration is defined as any case 
where a conviction was vacated on the grounds of 
new evidence of innocence from DNA testing 
and the indictment was dismissed without subse-
quent prosecution , the defendant was pardoned 
by a gove rnor, or the defendant was acquitted af-
ter trial. 
Like the National Transportation Safety Board, which 
investigates aircraft, railroad, and other accidents and 
issues recommendations, innocence commissions could 
review the causes of any officially acknowledged case of 
wrongful conviction and recommend remedies to prevent 
such miscarriages of justice from happening again. 
detailed opinion written about what 
went wrong in any of these cases, 
much less an analysis offering sugges-
tions on what could be done to pre-
vent similar miscarriages of justice. 
Instead, the exculpatory DNA re-
sults are received, an order vacating 
the conviction ( or a gubernatorial 
pardon) is issued, and, in a few cases, 
the judge or the governor offers an 
apology. To confound matters fur-
ther, many, but by no means all, of 
the public officials who should be 
most concerned about the underly-
ing causes of such wrongful convic-
tions blithely proclaim that the "sys-
tem has worked" and assiduously 
avoid the suggestion there is any-
thing further to investigate.2 Those 
officials who want to get to the root of 
these problems do not have an inde-
pendent body to which they can turn 
for further investigation or policy 
recommendations. 
In order to address effectively un-
derlying, institutional problems that 
contribute to the conviction of inno-
cent persons, we propose the cre-
ation of "innocence commissions"3 
to investigate and monitor errors in 
the criminal justice system just as the 
NTSB investigates and monitors air-
plane and other major transporta-
tion accidents in the United States. 
Simply put, innocence commissions 
should be automatically assigned to 
review the causes of any officially ac-
knowledged case of wrongful convic-
tion,4 whether the conviction was re-
versed with post-conviction DNA tests 
or through some other new evidence 
of innocence, and recommend rem-
edies to prevent such miscarriages of 
justice from happening again. 
There is no one best way to create 
state or federal level innocence com-
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missions. One can easily env1s10n 
such a commission being formed 
through legislative enactment, ex-
ecutive order, or appointment by the 
chief judicial officer of a state. Even 
the formation of an interdisciplinary 
group by a non-profit organization, 
or a state university system, could be 
the vehicle for an innocence commis-
sion as long as that entity is delegated 
appropriate legal authority and re-
sources to conduct fact-based investi-
gations. These entities must not 
merely be "study commissions" offer-
ing policy recommendations, but in-
vestigative agencies whose findings 
arise from direct review of actual 
cases. 
Thus, the key, necessary features of 
an innocence commission will be 
subpoena power, access to first- rate 
investigative resources, and political 
independence. Like the NTSB, an in-
stitution whose example is well worth 
emulating, these commissions must 
be trusted to speak out continually 
about cases where the system fails, 
without fear or favor, even if their rec-
ommendations are, for a while , ig-
nored by political, law enforcement, 
or judicial bodies. 
What follows is an effort to explain 
why innocence commissions can 
serve as a capstone reform that keeps 
in place a recurring systemic exami-
nation of defects and remedies in the 
criminal justice system before the 
current "learning moment" brought 
about by post-conviction DNA exon-
erations fades. This discussion is in-
tended to offer practical suggestions 
on what the organizing principles of 
such commissions should be, taking 
into account the political realities of 
criminal justice reform in the United 
States. 
Canadian and British models 
Fortunately, we are not writing on a 
blank slate. In Canada and Great 
Britain there are two distinctly differ-
ent kinds of institutions that address 
the problem of wrongful convictions 
that could serve as good working 
models. 
The Canadian "Public Inquiries" 
model. Canadian "Public Inquiries," 
also known as Royal Commissions or 
Commissions oflnquiry, were first es- · 
tablished more than 150 years ago as 
a way for sovereignties to conduct in-
dependent, non-government-affili-
ated investigations regarding the 
conduct of public businesses or the 
fair administration of justice.5 Each 
province and the federal Canadian 
government has passed legislation 
enabling the establishment of these 
independent public inquiries. Based 
on a direction from the executive 
branch, a public inquiry can be 
"chartered" to have designated per-
sons (frequently judges) investigate 
almost any issue of public concern. 
Canadian Public Inquiries have inves-
tigated a wide-range of issues includ-
ing contaminated blood supplies in 
the nation's hospitals and the status 
of women. 
Recently, however, separate public 
inquiries were conducted in the wake 
of two celebrated post-conviction 
DNA exonerations, Guy Paul Morin 
and Thomas Sophonow, producing 
comprehensive reports that both re-
viewed the specific circumstances of 
each case and issued findings regard-
ing systemic practices "that may have 
contributed to or influenced the 
course of the investigation or pros-
ecution. " 6 The designated leaders of 
the Morin and Sophonow Public In-
quiries had subpoena power, held 
hearings, recruited, when necessary, 
government laboratories or indepen-
dent experts, and issued reports that 
dealt with the specific causes of these 
wrongful convictions and made 
policy recommendations about rem-
edies to prevent wrongful convictions 
in the future. 
With some significant modifica-
tions, and drawing heavily upon the 
American experience with the NTSB, 
we believe the Morin and Sophonow 
inquiries represent a good model to 
track when designing innocence 
commissions in the U. S. 
The British Criminal Case Review 
Commission model. The Criminal 
Case Review Commission (CCRC) of 
Great Britain is, according to its own 
description, "an independent, open, 
thorough, impartial and accountable 
body investigating suspected miscar-
riages of justice in England, Wales, 
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and Northern Ireland. "7 By most ac-
counts, since its establishment in 
January 1997, the CCRC has evolved 
into an admirably effective and sub-
stantial governmental agency.8 If, after 
going through its four-stage process of 
screening and investigation, it finds a 
"real possibility" ofan "unsafe" convic-
tion or an unjust sentence, the CCRC 
can refer the case back to the appel-
late courts for further action, or make 
a recommendation for a Royal par-
don. While the CCRC does on occa-
sion discuss the causes of wrongful 
convictions and remedies, such analy-
sis has not been its principal mission, 
as the work of the CCRC occurs before, 
not after, an official acknowledgment 
by the courts that a wrongful convic-
tion has occurred. 
The CCRC has a I 4-member board 
of distinguished citizens; two thirds 
are lay persons, one third are lawyers, 
and one third must have some sort of 
criminal justice expertise. The major-
ity of investigations are handled by 
the CCRC itself and its staff. Where a 
case calls for specialized knowledge, 
the CCRC may hire an expert to ex-
amine the evidence and issue a re-
port. The CCRC has the authority to 
inspect and order the preservation of 
all materials held by a public body. It 
does not have a similar mandate for 
materials in the possession of private 
organizations or individuals, nor 
does it have the power to carry out 
searches, check criminal records, or 
make an arrest, but it can appoint an 
investigating officer, such as a police 
officer, who does have such powers, 
to work on the CCRC's behalf. 
An investigation is not considered 
complete until the CCRC shares its 
findings with applicants and offers 
5. Sellar, A Century of Commissions of Inquiry, 25 
CANADIAN BAR REv. 1, 1 (1947). 
6. See, "Thomas Sophonow Inquiry Report, " 
Province of Manitoba. Report available at: h!m;L 
/www.gov. mb.ca/ justice/sophonow/ toc.html.; 
and "Report of the Commission On Proceedings 
Involving Guy Paul Morin " Report available at: 
http://www.attorneyge n eral .j u s. gov .on .ca/ 
html/MORIN / morin.htm. 
7. See, http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/. 
8. See, Findley, supra n. 3, at 7-9; Horan, The In-
nocence Commission: An Independent Review Board 
for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 91 
(2000); Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convic-
tions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. I NT' L L. 
REv. 1241 (2001). 
The Royal Courts of Justice, London. The British Criminal Case Review 
Commission investigates suspected miscarriages of Justice In England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
them a chance to comment on the 
investigation . Once an investigation 
is comple ted , the CCRC decides 
whether to recommend the case for 
appeal. This decision must be made 
by a t least three board members. 
Since 1997, the CCRC has received 
3,680 applications, 2,381 of which 
have been reviewed as of October 31, 
2000 . Of those , 203 have been re-
ferred . Among the referrals, 49 have 
been heard and 38 of those (77.5 per-
cent of referrals, 1.6 percent of the 
original completed applications) re-
sulted in quashed convictions.9 If a 
decision for referral is made, it is up 
to the applicants and their legal rep-
resentative to make their case in ap-
pellate court. If an application is not 
9. Griffin , supra n . 8, a t 1277. 
I 0. A running li st of innocence proj ec ts work-
ing within the "innocence ne twork" can be found 
a t h ttp:// inn oce n ce p ro jec t. o rg /a b o u t / 
o the r p rojects.php. 
11. The "Guilford Four" case involved the dis-
missal of charges against suspected IRA members 
when evidence was foun d conclusive ly proving 
tha t the po lice had fabricated the defendants 
supposed confessions. In the "Bi rmingham Six" 
case, the court overturned IRA convictions based 
on defendan ts ' confessions when it was revealed 
that the supposed confessions had been drafted 
by the police after the fac t. See Griffi n , supra n . 8, 
a l 1248. 
12. A running list, text, and analysis of post-
conviction DNA statutes, as well as the Innocence 
Protection Act, a bi-partisan bill in Congress that 
would mandate post-conviction DNA testing in 
every sta te, is avai la bl e a t h.!!Jl.;L.l 
innocenceproject.org. 
13. Uni ted States v. Quinones, et al, No. S3 00 Cr. 
761 USR) Uuly I , 2002) . 
referred to an appeals court, the ap-
plicant may apply again if new evi-
dence or arguments appear in the fu-
ture. 
Notwithstanding the remarkable 
progress made by the CCRC in just 
five years, it is not the model we envi-
sion for "innocence commissions." 
This is certa inly not because the 
United States has no need for institu-
tions like the CCRC to pursue post-
conviction claims of innocence. On 
the contrary, compared to the net-
work of comparatively small and re-
source-starved innocence projects 
that have been formed at law schools, 
journalism schools, and public de-
fender offices throughout the United 
States, which endeavor to exonerate 
the factually innocent, 10 the CCRC is 
an impressively efficient, powerful , 
and superior institution. 
Rather, our reluctance to advocate 
this model arises from practical and 
political concerns. Proposals based 
on a CCRC model could be too easily, 
albeit unfairly, attacked as requiring 
large government bureaucracies 
based on un-American notions of an 
inquisitional justice system that 
would squander precious law en-
forcement funds on prisoners mak-
ing frivolous claims. On the other 
hand, following the example of the 
NTSB and Canadian Public Inquir-
ies, proposals for smaller public bod-
ies charged with exposing the root 
causes of wrongful convictions that 
have already been established as mis-
carriages of justice, will be a better 
first step in building an effective re-
form movement to redress basic flaws 
in the American criminal justice sys-
tem. Ultimately, as public under-
standing grows about the prevalence 
of wrongful convictions, institutions 
based on the CCRC model will be 
created. The CCRC, after all , was 
formed as a result of public outcry 
over revelations from public inquiry 
investigations into the notorious 
wrongful convictions of IRA defen-
dants in the Birmingham Six and 
Guilford Four cases. 11 
A "learning moment" 
Courts, scholars, and policy makers 
are all beginning to recognize that 
the most important aspect of the 
wave of post-conviction DNA exon-
erations is what it can teach us about 
all the other cases (the vast majority) 
where DNA testing is not available. 
This wave of exonerations has prob-
ably not crested. As states pass post-
conviction DNA statutes (there are 
now 27), 12 providing inmates an op-
portunity to prove their innocence, 
exonerations have and will continue 
to increase. But it would be short-
sighted not to assume the wave of 
DNA exonerations will eventually 
pass and foolish not to capitalize on 
what is plainly a "learning moment. " 
Most recently, a United States Dis-
trict Court judge, Jed Rakoff, citing 
the serious doubts regarding the reli-
ability of guilt or innocence findings 
in non-DNA cases raised by post-con-
viction DNA testing, actually found 
the federal death penalty an uncon-
stitutional violation of due process. 13 
While some have derided the deci-
sion as "eccentric" and unlikely to be 
sustained by appellate courts, those 
commentators generally acknowl-
edge the factual premise of Judge 
Rakoff's argument and agree that 
post-conviction exonerations in capi-
tal and non-capital cases, primarily 
through DNA testing, strongly 
"suggest[s] that the number of false 
convictions is higher than previously 
understood," which creates a need to 
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address the "innocence" issue di-
rectly. 
Empirical study by scholars of the 
wrongful convictions uncovered in 
the past decade has begun with re-
newed seriousness. 14 The case study 
approach for analyzing wrongful 
convictions laid out in 1932 by Pro-
fessor Edward Borchard in his classic 
work, Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-five 
Actual Errors of Criminal Justice, and 
powerfully supplemented by Hugo 
Bedeau and Michael Radelet's re-
search regarding capital cases 52 
years later, 15 will surely be followed by 
more statistically sophisticated analy-
ses similar to those employed by Pro-
fessors James Liebman and Jeffrey 
Fagan and their colleagues in studies 
examining reversals in death penalty 
cases. 16 As the pool of documented 
wrongful convictions rapidly grows, 
deconstructing the underlying pat-
terns will become increasingly pos-
sible, and academics from many dis-
ciplines will certainly take advantage 
of this "learning moment." 
Policy makers have also responded 
to the issue of convicting the inno-
cent with a series of "study" commis-
sions that have focused on wrongful 
convictions in capital cases and re-
form in the administration of the 
death penalty. Reports from commis-
sions in Nebraska, Indiana, Virginia, 
Maryland, Arizona, and Illinois have 
either been produced or are due 
soon. 17 
The Report of the Governor's 
Commission on Capital Punishment, 
a study requested by Governor 
George Ryan after he declared a 
moratorium on the death penalty in 
Illinois is by far the most impressive 
for its content and transparency. The 
Ryan Commission "carefully scruti-
nized" all 13 death row exonerations 
in Illinois, studied every reported de-
cision in a pending capital case, held 
public and private hearings, con-
sulted with nationally recognized ex-
perts, and commissioned their own 
empirical study of capital sentencing. 
In terms of our definition, as op-
posed to other study commissions, 
the Ryan Commission functioned as 
a true innocence commission be-
cause it derived its findings directly 
from the study of actual cases within" 
the jurisdiction. Significantly, the 
Ryan Commission was strongly influ-
enced by the methodology and find-
ings of the Guy Paul Morin and Tho-
mas Sophonow public inquiries in 
Canada, whose reports, again, arose 
from thorough study of two wrongful 
convictions. 
Ultimately, the Commission made 
85 detailed recommendations for re-
form and produced a valuable set of 
appendices. While many of these rec-
ommendations addressed problems 
specific to the administration of the 
capital punishment system in Illinois, 
most of the findings that related to 
problems associated with wrongful 
convictions, as the commission itself 
emphasized, were applicable to the 
entire criminal justice system. 18 
Soon after the Ryan Commission 
Report was released in April of 2002, 
leaders of the Illinois legislature ex-
pressed serious doubt about whether 
many of the 85 recommendations 
would be enacted in any form. 19 Nor 
can it be said that the Morin and 
Sophonow public inqmnes in 
Canada have resulted in rapid or 
comprehensive reforms despite the 
fact that the two Canadian inquiries 
reached similar findings. This should 
not come as a surprise. State legisla-
tures and criminal justice bureaucra-
14. The first survey study of post-conviction 
DNA exonerations can be found in Sheck, 
Neufeld. and Dwyer, Appendix 2: DNA Exonera-
tions at a Glance, in ACTUAL INNOCENCE, first and 
second editions, (2000, 2001) .. 
15. Bedeau and Radelet, Miscarriage of justice in 
Poten tially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 
(I 987); Rade let and Bedeau, IN SPITE OF INNO-
CENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 
(1992). 
16. Liebman and Fagan, et al , "A Broken Sys-
tem: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995," 
available at http://www.justice.policy.net/proac-
tive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=l8200; and "A 
Broken System, Part II: Why There is So Much 
Error in Capital Cases and What Can be Done 
About It ," available at h.!.m.d.L 
www. justice. policy.net/ cj reform/ dps tudy/ 
study/index.vtml. 
17. When Republican Governor of Illinois Ryan 
declared a moratorium on the death penalty, he 
also appointed a blue ribbon committee to exam-
ine the causes behind and offer reforms to pre-
vent wrongful convictions. That report was re-
leased in the spring of 2002 and is available at: 
http://www.idoc. state .ii. us/ ccp / ccp / reports/ 
commission reports .html. While a proposed 
moratorium on the death penalty in Nebraska 
failed, an extensive state-sponsored study released 
in 2001 of the administration of that state's death 
penalty found that economic and geographic 
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cies are not known for their flexible 
response to complex problems. Most 
state criminal justice systems consist 
of elected district attorneys from dif-
ferent counties, some rural and some 
very urban, as well as small and large 
police departments; it is not a simple 
matter to get these comparatively au-
tonomous actors to engage in co-
ordinated or uniform change. 
So it should not be cause for de-
spair that reforms recommended by 
study commissions, which are main-
stream, sensible, and bi-partisan, 
seem to be ignored. Rather, the im-
portant institutional question is how 
to maintain a steady public focus on 
underlying problems and remedies 
so the natural inclination of the po-
litical actors and law enforcement 
bureaucracies to resist them can be 
overcome. Can the creation of inno-
cence commissions consistently spot-
light systemic defects in the criminal 
justice system long after the "learn-
ing moment" of DNA exonerations 
ends? We think the history of the 
NTSB provides an encouraging an-
swer to this question. 
The NTSB example 
The NTSB was created by statute in 
197 4 to "investigate ... and establish 
the facts, circumstances, and prob-
able cause of' aircraft, highway, rail-
disparities were the most prevalent impediments 
to preventing wrongful convictions and offered a 
number of reforms. The study can be found at: 
http: //www.nadp.inetnedr /Study Page.html. 
Maryland's Governor also ordered a comprehen-
sive two-year study of the death penalty in March 
2001. Results are expected sometime in 2003. In-
diana re leased its study commission findings in 
December of 2001. Results of commission studies 
in Virginia, and Arizon a are pending. See, 
Liebman and Fagan, et al, supra n. 16, at 1. 
18. Ryan Commission, at Chapter 14, General 
Recommendations, and Recommendation 83. 
See also Thomas Sullivan, Preventing wrongful con-
victions, in this issue (page 106). 
19. See, McKinney, Capital Punishment &form? 
Don't Bet on it this Year, Chicago Sun-Times, April 
16, 2002, at 8: "Election year realities mean few 
lawmakers want to cast votes to scale back capital 
punishment, as the commission advises, and be 
portrayed as soft on crime, post-Sept. 11. 'I don't 
think this will be popular, " said Senate President 
James 'Pate' Philip (R-Wood Dale), ... who said 
he'd be surprised if there was any action on the 
issue this year." 
20. 49 U.S.C. § 1131, generally§ 1101-1155 
(2000). The NTSB was originally created in 1966 
under the Department of Transportation, where 
it languished. The independent NTSB as we 
know it today was established by the Independent 
Safety Board Act of 197 4. 
road, or major marine accidents and 
to issue reports and reform recom-
mendations to the Secretary of 
Transportation. 20 It has five mem-
bers, appointed by the president, 
with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, and, most importantly, it op-
erates independently from the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration. 
Prior to the establish-
ment of the NTSB, air 
traffic safety regulations 
were left to the FAA. 
Watchdogs complained 
that the FAA suffered 
under its so-called "dual 
mandate," to simulta-
neously promote a ir 
commerce and air 
safety, and the NTSB was 
established to take over 
safety investigations and 
relieve the FAA of this 
conflict of interest. 
At its own discretion, the NTSB 
forms a "special board of inquiry" fol-
lowing "an accident involv[ing] a 
substantial question about public 
safety." Investigators are selected by 
the NTSB Board; other interested 
parties may petition to be included, 
at the complete discretion of the 
Board, in the investigation. NTSB in-
vestigators have broad powers to con-
duct thorough investigations. In-
deed , according to its enabling 
legislation , the NTSB may "do any-
thing necessary to conduct an investi-
gation." The investigating committee 
may issue subpoenas and compel 
sworn testimony; order autopsies and 
other forensic tests "when necessary 
21. Carlisle, Comment: The FAA v. the NTSB: Now 
that Congress has Addressed the Federal Aviation 
Administration's "Dual Mandate," has the FAA Be-
gun Living Up to Its Amended Purpose of Making Air 
Travel Safer, or is the National Transportation Safety 
Board Still Doing Its job Alone? 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 
741, 757 (2001). 
22. The Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Person-
nel and Parties in NTSB Aviation Accident Investiga-
tions, pg. xiii., at http://www.rand.ori::/publica-
tions/MR/MRI 12.1 /MRI 12. I / pdf. 
23. Id. at pg. xxv. It should also be observed 
that some commentators are concerned that re-
cent case law, mandating deference to FAA inter-
pretations of laws and regulations, has begun to 
undermine the latitude of NTSB investigations 
and the abili ty of the NTSB to effect regulatory 
changes from the FAA. See, Singer, Garvey v. Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board: The FAA Gets 
its Cake and Eats it Too, 66 J. A.JR L. & COMM. 875 
(2001). 
to investigate an accident;" and may 
bring a civil action in federal court 
against any party that obstructs its in-
vestigation. Although the NTSB does 
not have the right to guarantee the 
confidentiality of witness statements, 
interviewees do have the right to 
have counsel or a non-legal represen-
tative present during the interview 
The NTSB may 11 do 
anything necessary 
to conduct an 
investigation." 
and the right to have any party, be-
sides the actual interviewer, excluded 
from the interview. 
Upon completion of an investiga-
tion, the NTSB delivers a report con-
sisting of two parts to the Secretary of 
Transportation: a factual record con-
taining all of the witness statements, 
factual observations, and discoveries 
made by the investigators; and a set 
of reform recommendations. The 
secretary is required by statute to give 
a "formal written response to each 
[NTSB] recommendation," within 90 
days of receiving an NTSB report. 
The secretary must state publicly 
whether the reform recommenda-
tions will be adopted in whole, in 
part, or not at all. 
The findings and recommenda-
tions of the NTSB cannot be used as a 
basis for civil or criminal liability, al-
though the factual record it creates 
can obviously be marshaled as evi-
dence in such proceedings. 21 In civil 
trials, NTSB investigators cannot be 
called on to testify, although parties 
may depose such investigators once, 
and use that deposition at trial. Dur-
ing their deposition, investigators are 
allowed to reference their notes and 
the factual record. The factual report 
is also admissible at trial as a public 
document exception to the hearsay 
rule. As for criminal trials, investiga-
tors may testify without restrictions in 
state or local grand jury hearings or 
criminal proceedings. 
The NTSB has been criticized as 
powerless to implement its own rec-
ommendations, but this weakness is 
really a source of strength and inde-
pendence. Since it doesn't have to 
concern itself with any-
thing except safety, the 
NTSB is not hamstrung 
by cost or political wor-
ries; it can afford, year af-
ter year, to repeat find-
ings that make the FAA, 
the airline industry, and 
the federal government 
uncomfortable. A recent 
study by the Rand Insti-
tute for Civil Justice con-
curs in this assessment, 
describing the NTSB as 
an agency that "enjoys 
the reputation of being the most in-
dependent safety investigative au-
thority in the world."22 
The Rand study notes that al-
though the NTSB is not a regulatory 
agency and its charge to make recom-
mendations regarding airline safety 
does not carry with it enforcement 
authority, the fact that commercial 
air travel has become accessible for 
millions increases the intensity of 
media and public scrutiny of major 
airline accidents, thereby enhancing 
the persuasive power ofNTSB investi-
gations and recommendations. 
Given these circumstances, an NTSB 
statement of cause may not legally 
bind the FAA to implement changes, 
but it certainly can bring about calls 
for change that "publicly" bind the 
FAA to adhere to NTSB recommen-
dations.23 
Essential elements 
The NTSB example, accordingly, 
helps underscore what elements are 
essential in any proposal to form vi-
able innocence commissions and 
suggests ways to modify some fea-
tures of the Canadian Public Inquiry 
model: 
( 1) Innocence commissions should be 
standing committees chartered to investi-
gate, at their own discretion, any wrong-
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Jul conviction24 and to recommend any 
public policy reforms they deem necessary. 
One problem with the Canadian 
Public Inquiry model is that its inves-
tigations must be triggered by a direc-
tion from the executive branch. 
Aside from the danger that the ex-
ecutive branch simply won't charter 
investigations it doesn't like, this ap-
proach also runs the risk that review 
of officially acknowledged wrongful 
convictions only occur as a response 
to public pressure. Hopefully, the op-
posite dynamic will be in play. By rou-
tinely examining wrongful convic-
tions, including cases that are not 
"high profile," innocence commis-
sions will be able to bring serious 
scrutiny and public attention to seri-
ous problems and misconduct that 
would have otherwise been ignored 
and forgotten; 
(2) Innocence commissions need the 
power to order reasonable and necessary 
investigative services, including forensic 
testing, autopsies, and other research ser-
vices. 
It seems wise to keep the perma-
nent innocence commission bureau-
cracy as small as possible, expanding 
on a contractual basis when a case 
demands it. Usually existing agen-
cies, such as state or local crime labo-
ratories, could provide adequate fo-
rensic services. In fact, this is the 
approach taken by the Morin and 
Sophonow Canadian Public Inquir-
ies, who sent the forensic evidence 
pertaining to the case to provincial 
laboratories. And while the Morin in-
quiry cost the province around $3 
million, most of these costs were asso-
ciated with the cost of providing ev-
ery intervenor with their own coun-
sel in addition to the investigative 
resources expenses accrued. It is con-
ceivable that an effective innocence 
commission could operate on a far 
smaller budget. For example, a 
commission's initial inability to cre-
ate civil or criminal liability to any of 
the participating parties may cut 
down on attorney's fees. 
On the other hand, innocence 
commissions should not be stymied 
in their investigations by arbitrary 
budget cuts from the executive, the 
legislature, or even the administra-
tive office of the judiciary. One solu.: 
tion might be arbitration or court re-
view of disputes over requests for in-
vestigative resources; 
( 3) Innocence commissions must have 
the power to sub-poena documents, compel 
testimony, and bring civil actions against 
any person or entity that obstructs its in-
vestigations. 
Such powers are simply indispens-
able. Without the ability to lift up flat 
rocks and see what's underneath, in-
nocence commissions will revert to 
being weak, ineffectual "study" 
groups that can be disregarded with 
impunity by those who most need ex-
posure. The incredible and indis-
pensable revelatory power of deposi-
tions is exemplified by the "Ford 
Heights Four" case.25 In 1978, three 
men and one woman were convicted 
of the abduction and murder of one 
woman and the murder and rape of 
another. The men were primarily 
convicted based on a tip from a man 
claiming to have seen them near the 
murder scene and the testimony of a 
co-defendant who was forced to con-
fess to the crime and then offered a 
reduced sentence if she agreed totes-
tify against her co-defendants. The 
convictions of all four were over-
turned in 1999 based on DNA testing 
that excluded them as the perpetra-
tors. Only during depositions taken 
in preparation for the exonerees civil 
suit against Cook County was it re-
vealed that the convictions rested on 
evidence and information never 
turned over to the defense, due to 
police and prosecutorial misconduct. 
It is clear from this egregious ex-
ample that depositions are a neces-
sary mechanism for any procedure 
dedicated to identifying the causes 
leading to wrongful convictions. 
( 4) The findings and recommendations 
of innocence commissions should not be 
binding in any subsequent civil or crimi-
nal proceeding, although the factual 
record created uy the commission can be 
made available to the public. 
Like the NTSB, this feature of an 
innocence commission will ulti-
mately prove to be a source of 
strength, not weakness, a way to pre-
serve independence and insulate the 
commission from political pressures. 
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Nor will it unfairly restrict civil or 
criminal cases. 
As a practical matter, federal civil 
rights litigation for victims of wrong-
ful convictions are very difficult and 
often prohibitively expensive under-
takings. Prosecutors have absolute 
immunity from civil lawsuits for any 
actions they take while engaged in 
litigating a criminal case, even if it in-
cludes unlawful, even criminal sup-
pression of exculpatory evidence, 
and qualified immunity (good faith is 
a defense) for their investigative ac-
tivities. 26 Police officers have quali-
fied immunity for their conduct out-
side the courtroom, and absolute 
immunity for in court testimony.27 
The legal issue of qualified immu-
nity can be the subject of interlocu-
tory appeal, thereby greatly protract-
ing the time and expense civil rights 
plaintiffs must expend during litiga-
tion.28 And quite frequently, the law-
suits would have to be filed against 
law enforcement officials with great 
power in the community. Lawyers 
are extremely reluctant to take on 
such matters unless a "slam dunk" 
constitutional violation is apparent 
from the record. It is highly unlikely 
24. A wrongful conviction should be carefully 
defined. Ordinarily, it should embrace just those 
cases where a conviction has been vacated based, 
in part, on new evidence of innocence, and the 
indictment was subsequently dismissed, the de-
fendant was acquitted, or the governor issued a 
pardon. The innocen ce commission should, 
however, have discretion to reach tougher cases, 
such as instances where new evidence of inno-
cence leads to a conviction being vacated and a 
deal is struck p ermitting an Alford or nolo 
contendre plea to time served. Such arrangements 
are often impossible for an innocent defendant 
to turn down and invite abuse, especially if law 
enforcement officials insist on such an arrange-
ment in order to avoid an innocence commission 
inquiry. 
25. For a more detailed report, see Protess and 
Warden, A Promise of justice, at: h!.m.fl 
www.law.northwestern .edu/depts /clinic/wrong-
ful /readings /wa rd en protess/TOC .htm. 
Lawrence Marshall and Thomas Sullivan also dis-
cuss this case in articles in this issue, see Do exon-
erations prove that "the system works? (page 83) and 
Preventing wrongful convictions (page 106). 
26. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S. 
Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed.2d 209 (1993); Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed.2d 
128 (1976). 
27. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 
2151, 150 L. Ed.2d 272 (2001) (qualified immu-
nity); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 
1108, 75 L. Ed.2d 96 (1983) (absolute testimo-
nial immunity) ; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed.2d 396 (1982) 
(qualified immunity). 
28. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 4 72 U.S. 511, 524-530, 
105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed.2d 411 (1985). 
that an innocence commission in-
vestigation will get in the way of a 
plaintiff seeking civil relief; if any-
thing, revelations from an inno-
cence commission investigation 
might provide the stimulation law-
yers need to pursue meritorious but 
costly lawsuits. 
Similarly, criminal prosecutions 
arising out of law en-
forcement misconduct 
in wrongful conviction 
cases are very rare, and 
generally arise only 
when evidence is over-
whelming or public 
pressure compels a seri-
ous investigation. It's 






sions shou/,d be transparent, publicly ac-
countab/,e bodies, composed of diverse, re-
spected members of the criminal justice 
community and the public. 
A major reason for the creation of 
innocence commissions is to bolster 
public confidence in the fairness of 
the criminal justice system. It goes 
without saying that its members must 
command respect, represent all sides 
of the criminal justice system, and re-
flect the diversity of the public it 
serves. Nor would the goal of enhanc-
ing public confidence be well served 
if innocence commissions operate 
with the secrecy of a grand jury, or if 
they conduct public hearings that are 
designed more for drama than gath-
ering useful information. 
A balance needs to be stuck. There 
are plain advantages to the Canadian 
Public Inquiry method; it permits in-
terested parties to call and cross-ex-
amine witnesses and it uses liberal 
rules of evidence. On the other 
hand, innocence commissions must 
be careful not to drag out their in-
quiries; they need clear authority to 
exercise sensible control over the 
length and breadth of their proceed-
29. Letter to Massachusetts Governor Alvin 
Fuller from Edwin Borchard, dated April 21, 
1927. Borchard Papers, Yale University Archives. 
ings. In terms of transparency, it 
should be noted that the CCRC's an-
nual reports, website, and disclosure 
of budgetary information stands as 
an excellent template; and 
(6) Innocence commissions should be 
required to fi/,e public reports on their find-
ings and recommendations, and the rel-
evant branch of government to which these 
A capstone reform 
Innocence commissions should be 
seen as a capstone reform because 
they have the capacity, through the 
recurring perusal of wrongful convic-
tions, to provide a consistent, power-
ful impetus to remedy systemic de-
fects that bring about wrongful 
convictions. While criminal justice 
politics will inevitably 
swing between "liberal" 
and "conservative" eras, 
the fundamental desire 
Innocence commissions 
should be seen as a 
capstone reform. 
of citizens to make sure 
the system can reliably 
determine who is guilty 
and who is innocent 
should remain constant. 
That is why anchoring in-
nocence commissions to 
actual cases where there 
have been undeniable 
reports are submitted shou/,d issue a for-
mal written response to the recommenda-
tions within a fixed period of time. 
As noted at the outset, state crimi-
nal justice systems are sufficiently di-
verse in structure that one could an-
ticipate innocence commissions to 
be created by the legislature, the ex-
ecutive, or the judiciary branches. In 
theory, it does not matter how such 
entities are formed as long as appro-
priate organizing principles are fol-
lowed that permit the commissions 
independence and genuine capacity 
to investigate and make meaningful 
recommendations. As demonstrated 
by the NTSB, from whose charter this 
proposed element is drawn, the suc-
cess of an innocence commission will 
not necessarily turn on whether its 
recommendations are immediately 
adopted. Ultimately, what matters 
most is that the findings and recom-
mendations are clearly elucidated 
and made transparent to the public, 
and the relevant branch or branches 
of government to whom they are re-
ported respond in writing within a 
fixed period of time. Such a proce-
dure ensures that innocence commis-
sions will over time become an in-
creasingly valuable, independent 
public force for remedying the 
causes of wrongful convictions. 
miscarriages of justice is 
a sound long-term strategy. 
It is encouraging to see leaders in 
the judiciary, the legislature, and the 
executive branches of government 
and members of the academy pro-
pose different kinds of innocence 
commissions. Soon, however, the 
process of experimentation must be-
gin in the laboratory of the states; in-
ventive judges, legislators, and gover-
nors should act before the "learning 
moment" occasioned by the exonera-
tion of so many innocents begins to 
wane. 
In 1927, Yale professor Edward 
Borchard, perhaps the father of mod-
ern "innocence" scholarship, made a 
memorable plea to Governor Lowell 
Fuller for a commission to investigate 
the convictions of Sacco and Vanzetti. 
"I write to you," Borchard stressed, "not 
as a radical sympathizer with the con-
victed men, but as a person interested 
in the preservation of our legal institu-
tions. This depends on earning and re-
taining the respect of the public for 
those institutions. In a democracy, the 
confidence of the public in the fair and 
unbiased administration of justice lies 
close the roots of orderly govern-
ment. "29 We couldn't agree more. i 1i 
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